Step 1 of 5
Normalise the password
The password is converted to Unicode NFKC so it is byte-for-byte identical on every device and keyboard.
NIP-49
DraftEncoding
Defines ncryptsec, a password-protected form of a secret key. The password is stretched with scrypt, the key is encrypted with XChaCha20-Poly1305, and the result is a bech32 string starting with ncryptsec1 that is safe to back up but not to publish.
Edit the form or the JSON: both stay in sync, the badge says whether the result is valid, and tapping any field explains it.
Select any field in the form or the JSON to see what it does.
Step 1 of 5
The password is converted to Unicode NFKC so it is byte-for-byte identical on every device and keyboard.
Uses bech32 like NIP-19 entities, with its own ncryptsec prefix.
Another way to back up a key: a mnemonic phrase.
Remote signers avoid moving the key around at all.
Specification text is quoted in English from the nostr-protocol/nips repository. Our explanations and the interface are translated. Source on GitHub at commit 0046368
This NIP defines a method by which clients can encrypt (and decrypt) a user's private key with a password.
PASSWORD = Read from the user. The password should be unicode normalized to NFKC format to ensure that the password can be entered identically on other computers/clients.
LOG_N = Let the user or implementer choose one byte representing a power of 2 (e.g. 18 represents 262,144) which is used as the number of rounds for scrypt. Larger numbers take more time and more memory, and offer better protection:
| LOG_N | MEMORY REQUIRED | APPROX TIME ON FAST COMPUTER |
|-------|-----------------|----------------------------- |
| 16 | 64 MiB | 100 ms |
| 18 | 256 MiB | |
| 20 | 1 GiB | 2 seconds |
| 21 | 2 GiB | |
| 22 | 4 GiB | |
SALT = 16 random bytes
SYMMETRIC_KEY = scrypt(password=PASSWORD, salt=SALT, log_n=LOG_N, r=8, p=1)
The symmetric key should be 32 bytes long.
This symmetric encryption key is temporary and should be zeroed and discarded after use and not stored or reused for any other purpose.
The private key encryption process is as follows:
PRIVATE_KEY = User's private (secret) secp256k1 key as 32 raw bytes (not hex or bech32 encoded!)
KEY_SECURITY_BYTE = one of:
ASSOCIATED_DATA = KEY_SECURITY_BYTE
NONCE = 24 byte random nonce
CIPHERTEXT = XChaCha20-Poly1305( plaintext=PRIVATE_KEY, associated_data=ASSOCIATED_DATA, nonce=NONCE, key=SYMMETRIC_KEY )
VERSION_NUMBER = 0x02
CIPHERTEXT_CONCATENATION = concat( VERSION_NUMBER, LOG_N, SALT, NONCE, ASSOCIATED_DATA, CIPHERTEXT )
ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY = bech32_encode('ncryptsec', CIPHERTEXT_CONCATENATION)
The output prior to bech32 encoding should be 91 bytes long.
The decryption process operates in the reverse.
The following password input: "ÅΩẛ̣"
Should be converted into the unicode normalized NFKC format prior to use in scrypt: "ÅΩẛ̣"
The encryption process is non-deterministic due to the random nonce.
The following encrypted private key:
ncryptsec1qgg9947rlpvqu76pj5ecreduf9jxhselq2nae2kghhvd5g7dgjtcxfqtd67p9m0w57lspw8gsq6yphnm8623nsl8xn9j4jdzz84zm3frztj3z7s35vpzmqf6ksu8r89qk5z2zxfmu5gv8th8wclt0h4p
When decrypted with password='nostr' and log_n=16 yields the following hex-encoded private key:
3501454135014541350145413501453fefb02227e449e57cf4d3a3ce05378683
Passwords make poor cryptographic keys. Prior to use as a cryptographic key, two things need to happen:
These are achieved using a password-based key derivation function. We use scrypt, which has been proven to be maximally memory hard and which several cryptographers have indicated to the author is better than argon2 even though argon2 won a competition in 2015.
XChaCha20-Poly1305 is typically favored by cryptographers over AES and is less associated with the U.S. government. It (or it's earlier variant without the 'X') is gaining wide usage, is used in TLS and OpenSSH, and is available in most modern crypto libraries.
It is not recommended that users publish these encrypted private keys to nostr, as cracking a key may become easier when an attacker can amass many encrypted private keys.
It is recommended that clients zero out the memory of passwords and private keys before freeing that memory.